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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 14256
LONNIE DAVID CASE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding in which the
defendant, Lonnie David Case, was charged with the
crime of aggravated robbery by an information filed in
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, on May 15, 1975.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant was tried by jury before the
Honorable Gordon R. Hall, District Judge on August 22,
1975, and found guilty of aggravated robbery.

On the

same day, the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate
term of five years to life at the Utah State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant submits that his conviction should be
reversed

or in the alternative, a new trial granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 14, 1975, a complaint was issued by
Judge Paul Grant in the City Court of Salt Lake City,
charging Lonnie David Case with the crime of aggravated
robbery in violation of Utah Code Annotated 76-6-302 (1953)
(R. 5)

The complaint alleged that the defendant-appellant

using a deadly weapon, a knife, robbed Myrna Barker cind
took $129.00 cash from the cash register on the 10th day
of April, 1975.

On May 15, 1975 the appellant was charged

in District Court of the Third Judicial District by an
information alleging this offense. (R.6)
Prior to trial, the attorney for the defendant,
Jack Kunkler, filed a notice of intention to claim alibi
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 77-22-17 (Supp. 1953). (R.8)
The defendant claimed that at the time of the alleged offense
he was at the Granada Apartments on 47th South and Redwood
Road in the presence of Craig Christensen, Brent Christensen,
Neil Mahlum and Glenna Mahlum.
The appellant was tried by jury before the Honorable
Gordon R. Hall, Third Judicial District Judge on August
22, 1975, and was found guilty by the jury of aggravated
robbery as
charged in the Information. (R.15) The appellant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was sentenced on the same day to an indeterminate term
of 5 to life at the Utah State Prison, the sentence to
run concurrently with the sentence he was then serving.
(R.36)
At the trial, the State's first witness was Myrna
Barker, who was employed at the 7-11 Grovery Store located
at 4690 South and Redwood Road in Salt Lake County. (R.48)
Mrs. Barker testified that while working alone on the
3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M. shift an individual whom she identified
at the trial as the defendant entered the store just after
10:00 P.M. on April 10th. (R. 49)

She testified that while

at the counter, the individual had come up behind her, put a
knife against her back and said, "Empty the tills."

(R.50)

After she opened the till, the defendant, according to the
testimony of the witness, took all of the currency, about
$120.00, and placed it in his pocket. (R. 51)

She described

the knife used in the robbery as a pocket knife. Mrs. Barker
testified that the individual she identified as the appellant
after taking a carton of cigarettes left the store by foot and
walked south on Redwood Road.

(R. 52)

On cross-examination,

the witness testified that the time of the offense had to be
between 10:00 P.M. and 10:30 P.M. and that at the time she didn't
smell alcohol on his breath.

(R. 54)

Officer Bruce Clements, a deputy sheriff with Salt Lake
County, was qualified as an expert and testified that he attempted
-3-
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to take fingerprints at the store after the offense, but
was unable to discover any latent prints. (R. 63)

These two

witnesses comprised the extent of the States examination in
chief.
The defendant's counsel called as a witness Mrs.
Glenna Mahlum who testified she had known the defendant
for eight years.

(R. 69)

She testified that on April 10,

of 1975, the day of the offense, the defendant was at her
home along with several other people and they were celebrating
her birthday.

According to Mrs. Mahlum the defendant was in

her presence for the entire evening until after 11:00 P.M.

Her

husband, Neil Mahluti gave a similar account of that evening.
(R. 81)

He indicated that he knew the defendant did not

leave until after 11:00 P.M. because of the program they were
all watching on television.

The next witness presented by the

defense, Brent Christensen, corroborated the testimony
given by the Mahlums. (R.93)
Officer Labrum was recalled by the defendant. (R.101)
He said that he had interviewed the Mahlumsafter the robbery
and they told him that the appellant had left their home at about
11:15 P.M. on the evening in question. (R.104)

On cross-

examination he testified that Mrs. Mahlun had told him that
the appellant and the Christensen brothers had arrived at
about 5:00 P.M. (R. Ill)
The state stipulated that the appellant was arrested
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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at 2:40 A.M. on April 11th for public intoxication. (R. 84)
The State's first rebuttal witness was Craig
Christensen who was present under subpoena by the defendant.
(R. 133)

On examination by the State, he reaffirmed the

story given by his brother and the Mahlums. He also testified
that he had hever had any conversations with Mrs. Barker
at the 7-11 store converning the robbery following the
incident.

The prosecutor also asked him where the appellant

Mr. Case was living on April 22.

(R. 140)

The witness

asnwered "with his parents while he was out of the point."
The State then recalled Neal and Glenna Mahlum to the stand
and they reaffirmed their testimony on direct. (R. 141, 142)
The fourth and final wintess called by the State was
Mrs. Barker, who had testified in the case in chief. (R. 143)
She stated that after the incident Craig Christensen had come
into the store and said that he knew the person that robbed
the store. (R. 145)

She further testified that Craig Christensen

had said "that he had been with Mr. Case the night of the
robbery and that he had tried to get him to go with him and
he hadn't went." (R. 148)
On surrebuttal, the defense called Craig Christensen
to the stand and he denied ever making the alleged statements
to which Mrs. Barker had testified. (R. 154)
did not know who had robbed the store.
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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He stated that he

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO EXCLUDE THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE STATE IN REBUTTAL
OF THE APPELLANT'S ALIBI DEFENSE BECAUSE OF THE STATE'S
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 77-22-17(Supp.
1953) AND THE TRIAL COURT DENIED THE DEFENDANT THE RIGHT
TO RECIPROCAL DISCOVERY UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
The Attorney for the Defendant, Jack Kunkler, filed
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 77-22-17 (Supp. 1953) a notice
of intention to claim an alibi

defense on June 3, 1975.

(R. 8). The defendant listed in this notice all of the
witnesses to be called by the defense to establish the alibi,
as well as specifying the place at which the defendant claimed
to have been at the time the offense was committed.
The prosecution did not file within five days as
required by 77-22-17 (1) the names or addresses of witnesses
to be offered in rebuttal.

Before the trial began, the prosecutor

in chambers, revealed his intention to call four rebuttal
witnesses. (%15%)•

In response to this disclosure, the

appellant moved to exclude all evidence offered by the State in
rebuttal on the authority of 77-22-17(3).

(£($#).

The trial

court denied the motion and the State introduced the rebuttal
evidence.

(R. 133-153).

The appellant moved for a mistrial

at the close of evidence on the failure of the State to comply
by the Howard(R.
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
with the Digitized
Statute.
157).
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Annotated 77-22-17, which was enacted by
the laws of 1975, Chapter 34, Section 1 and effective at
the time of appellant's trial provides:
(1) . . . Not less than five days after
receipt of defendant's witness list,
or such other times as the court may
direct, the prosecuting attorney shall
file and serve upon the defendant the
names and addresses of the witnesses
the state proposes to offer in rebuttal
to discredit the defendant's alibi at
the trial of the cause.
(2)

Both the defendant and the prosecuting
attorney shall be under a continuing
duty to promptly disclose the names
and addresses of additional witnesses
which come to the attention of either
party subsequent to filing their respective witness lists as provided in
this section.

(3)

If a defendant fails to file and serve
a copy of the notice as required in
subsection (1), the Court may exclude
evidence offered by the defendant for
the purpose of proving an alibi, except
the testimony of the defendant himself.
If the prosecuting attorney fails to file
and serve a copy on the defendant of a list
of witnesses as provided in subsection (1),
the court may exclude evidence offered by
the state in rebuttal to the defendant's
alibi evidence.

(4)

For good cause shown the court may waive the
requirements of this section.

The current statute replaced the previous notice of alibi
statute, Utah Code Annotated 77-22-17, L. 1935, Ch. 120,
Seciton 1, which unlike the present statute did not require
the prosecution to disclose their witnesses while requiring the
defendant to give notice of his defense.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The current statute does not contain the constitutional infirmities which were present in the former statute
as a result of its lack of reciprocal discovery by the
defendant.

The United States Supreme Court held in

Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U. S. 470 (1972) that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the enforcement
of an alibi statute unless a reciprocal right to discover
the State's case if given to criminal defendants.

The

Court found that in the absence of such an opportunity to
discover the State's rebuttal witnesses, a criminal defendant
cannot be compelled to reveal his alibi defense.

The Court

reasoned that it is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant
to divulge the details of his own case while at the same
time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning
refutation of the very evidence he discloses to the State.
In the light of the rule announced in Wardius v.
Oregon, the prosecution is compelled to disclose to the
defendant a list of the names and addresses of the witnesses
used to rebut the alibi defense on constitutional grounds,
as well as on any statutory grounds. A failure by the State
to reciprocate and properly disclose its witnesses violates
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the
defendant has been required to furnish alibi information to
the State.

As Justice Marshall said in the opinion in Wardius:
-8-
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The State may not insist that trials be run
or a "search for truth" so far as defense
witnesses are concerned while maintaining
"poker game" secrecy for its own witnesses,
at 470 U. S. 475.
In Commonwealth v. Jackson,

Pa.

____

319 A. 2d 161 (1974), the defendant, pursuant to
the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure had
notified the Commonwealth of the names and addresses
of the witnesses he intended to call to establish an
alibi.

The defendant's request for the names and addresses

of those witnesses the Commonwealth planned to produce to
refute his alibi was refused by the trial court.

The

Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth was constititionally
bound to afford the defendant reciprocal discovery as required
by Wardius v. Oregon

Supra.

The Court said:

Due process requires that if an accused
is compelled to comply with a notice of
alibi rule, the the Commonwealth must
reciprocate and provide the names and
addresses of all witnesses who will be
called to refute an accused's alibi
regardless of whether the witnesses will
be called in rebuttal or in the Commonwealth
case in chief.
Note 4 at 163.(Emphasis
added.)
The conviction of the defendant in Jackson was reversed
and a new trial was granted because the Commonwealth had not
shown that the constitutional error involved was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court reasoned that if the

defendant had been afforded reciprocal discovery, he would
have hadDigitized
theby the
opportunity
to be better prepared to crossHoward W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

examine and to impeach the government witnesses.
In light of the foregoing authority the trial
court's failure to exclude the State1s rebuttal evidence
constituted reversable error on either of two grounds:
(1)

the trial court abused its discretion under 77-12-17 in

refusing to exclude the State's rebuttal evidence, and (2)
toe denial of reciprocal discovery violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As to the first ground, Utah Code Annotated 77-22-17
specifically states that the prosecution within 5 days shall
"file and serve upon the defendant the names and addresses of
the witnesses the State proposes to offer in rebuttal to
discredit the defendant's alibi. . ."

The clear language

of the statute requires the prosecution to notify the defendant
of the witnesses to be called on rebuttal even though these
same witnesses may also be subpoened for the prosecution's
case in chief.
In the present case, the prosecutor, Mr. Anderson,
indicated that he believed he had not violated the statute
because his witnesses were available to the defense to
question. (R. 161)

Mr. Craig Christensen was subpoened

by the defense though never called and was present at
trial.

Mrs. Barker was called by the prosecution on direct

and the prosecutor stated that defense counsel could have
examined her at any time.
However, the statute requires more discovery than was
allowed the
appellant by the prosecution. In State v. Anderson,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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25 Utah 2d 26, 474 P. 2d 735 (1970) this Court held under
the former alibi statute that:
Section 77-12-17, U. C. A. 1953, not only
specified the time within which the notice
must be filed but the requisite information
which must be included therein. A failure
to comply forecloses the defendant from
introducing evidence tending to establish an
alibi. However, the statute does grant the
trial court discretion where good cause is
shown why the defense failed to file the
required notice. at 736.
In Anderson, the Court was dealing with a failure by the defendant
not the prosecition as in this case to supply proper notice
of alibi.

Similar exclusionary principles should apply with

equal force to the prosecution when a proper notice is not
filed.

Subsection (4) of 77-12-17 as amended requires the

prosecution to show good cause before the requirements can be
waived.

The prosecution in the present case did not come forward

with any evidence prior to the deadline for filing the list of
rebuttal witnesses to warrant a waiver.

The records does not

disclose that the prosecution had established "good cause"
for the failure to file the required information.

The fact that

the witnesses were called on direct examination as available
to be interviewed by the appellant's counsel at trial is not
sufficient cause for noncompliance with the requirements of the
statute,prior to the deadline for filing, to warrant a
waiver of the requirements.

The fact that the rebuttal

witnesses were also called on direct examination and
available during the trial to be interviewed is not
sufficient
cause
for
non-compliance
with
theBYU.requirements
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
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Secondly/ by not enforcing reciprocal discovery
the trial court violated the defendant's right under Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to discover
the prosecution's witnesses.

Wardius v. Oregon, supra

and Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra.

Thus, even if this

Court does not find that the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to exclude the evidence, the conviction of the
appellant should be reversed on these constitutional grounds.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL AFTER PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE HAD
BEEN ADMITTED THAT THE APPELLANT HAD BEEN INCARCERATED IN
THE UTAH STATE PRISON.
During the re-direct examination of witness Craig
Christensen,the prosecutor, John Anderson, asked the witness
if he knew whre Mr. Case was living at the time.

The witness

answered "With his parents while we was out at the point but
he was living with his parents." (R. 140)

Just prior to

this testimony, the appellant's counsel on cross-examination had
asked Craig Christensen if there was any particular reason
that he recalled it was April 10. Unexpectedly the witness
answered, "No, just that it was the day that he had come out
of prison." (R. 138)

The attorney for the appellant made a

motion for a mistrial based on these prejudicial disclosures.
(R. 138)

In this motion, the appellant claimed that it was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

common knowledge that
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Machine-generated
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"point" was understood by the jury as a reference to the
Utah State Prison which is located at the Point of the
Mountain.

Also, the attorney for the appellant stated that

he had no knowledge that the witness called by the State
would make the disclosure that the appellant had recently
been in prison.

Evidence that the defendant had been in the

State Prison is equivalent to the evidence that the accused had
committed other serious crimes.
In State v. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 160, 478 P. 2d 491
(1970),

Court said that the law clearly holds that evidence

of other crimes is not admissable if its sole purpose is to
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character with
a propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have committed
the crime charged.

State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P. 2d

811 (1970), State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 267, 451 P. 2d 772 (1969).
In that case, the Court found the error was not prejudicial
in light of the statements made by the defendant himself on
cross-examination.
This Court has consistently held that evidence of
another crime to be prejudicial.

State v. Dickson, 12

Utah 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961); State v. Kazada, 14 Utah
2d 266, 382 P. 2d 407 (1963).
In State v. Dicksonr supra, the District Attorney on
cross-examination of the defendant was allowed to question
him about a charge that he had been an accessory to a robbery
in Texas.
The Court said:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It's only effect was to cast aspersions upon the
defendant and to imply that because he was involved
in the Texas trouble he is a person of evil
character who would be likely to commit such a
crime as the robbery charged. at 414.
The Court added:
Inasmuch as we cannot say with any degree of
assurance that there would not have been a
different result in the absence of the error
in cross-examining the defendant about the
incident in Texas it must be regarded as
prejudicial and the case remanded for a new
trial. at 415.
The evidence that the Appellant had recently been
an inmate at the

Utah State Prison had no probative value

to any issue in the trial.

The only effect this evidence

could have on the jury was to substantially prejudice
the right of the Appellant to a fair trial.

The admission

of this evidence is not the type of error which could
be regarded as a mere irregularity or of such inconsequential
nature that it could not have been prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the Appellant.

State v. Dickson,

supra, State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P. 2d 388 (1957).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the appellant respectfully
submits that the conviction and judgment of the trial court
should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT VAN SCIVER
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